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Abstract 
Africa is one of the world regions whose development potentials are particularly 
important. But despite this situation, Africa is one of the continents where poverty 
exists on a large scale. More than 44 % of the African population lives below the 
poverty line. Yet, various forms of development strategies have been designed and 
implemented in the African countries. In 1992, in its publication Governance and 
Development, the World Bank refers to the quality of government as the cause of the 
failure of several of these strategies. Attention is henceforth focused on how 
governments organize the management of state and govern economic activities. The 
place and the role of institutions in development have been widely discussed in 
economic literature. It is commonly accepted that the existence of strong and clear 
rules is a fundamental basis for economic activity. In particular, there is an 
increasingly agreement on the idea that, in order to stimulate private investment, it is 
necessary to stabilize the business environment. This study uses the World Bank 
Doing Business indicators to evaluate the influence of business environment in 
explaining private investment from a panel of thirty-eight African Sub-Saharan 
countries over the period 2006-2011. We performed a dynamic panel model using the 
Generalized Method of Moments estimation. The following evidence globally 
emerges: burdensome regulations affect private investment while business 
environment improvement makes investment grow.  
   
Keywords: Governance, business environment, investment. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
It is widely accepted that investment is one of the most important determinants of growth. 
From the point of view of economic analysis it is stated that productive investment impacts both 
the supply and the demand and contributes to growth and job creation. From the supply side, 
investment improves the productive capacity through the acquisition of new equipment that 
incorporates technical progress and consequently contributes to the increase in labor productivity. 
These productivity gains could then spread to other economic sectors. From the demand side, 
investment helps to increase demand for goods and services due to the fact that the observed 
productivity gains may lead to prices reduction and wages increase. These two phenomena lead to 
an increase of households’ purchasing power and then an increase of demand. This was the case 
in Africa in the few past years where growth was mainly driven by domestic demand (AfDB, 
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OECD, & UNDP, 2014)1. Indeed, Africa experienced in recent years, at the same time an increase 
in domestic consumption due to high levels of wages and remittances and high levels of private 
investment and infrastructure investment. These factors led to an increase in domestic demand.  
Basically investment, that is to say the change in the capital stock between two periods, 
depends on two factors: the cost of capital and market opportunities. The cost of capital as 
measured by the interest rate is used to analyze the profitability of investment projects. As for 
market opportunities, they respond to the concern that investment decisions are guided by the 
possibility of achieving maximum returns from the sales of the company. From a macroeconomic 
perspective, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is then determined by the change in aggregate 
demand and thus by economic growth. Beyond these factors, there are a multitude of variables that 
are likely to determine investment decisions. Two types of factors can be put forward in this regard: 
the macroeconomic factors and factors related to the economic environment. Among the 
macroeconomic factors one can mention the volume of long-term credit to the economy which is 
partly determined by the availability of savings, the volume of public investment and the level of 
government debt. For factors related to the economic environment one could retain the Doing 
Business indicators and governance indicators (political stability, legal system and corruption in 
particular). 
Africa is one of the world regions whose development potentials are particularly important. 
But despite this situation, Africa is one of the continents where poverty exists on a large scale. 
More than 44 % of the African population lives below the poverty line. Yet, various forms of 
development strategies have been designed and implemented in the African countries. In 1992, in 
its publication Governance and Development, the World Bank refers to the quality of government 
as the cause of the failure of several of these strategies. Attention is henceforth focused on how 
governments organize the management of state and govern economic activities.  
The place and the role of institutions in development have been widely discussed in 
economic literature. It is commonly accepted that the existence of strong and clear rules is a 
fundamental basis for economic activity. In particular, there is an increasingly agreement on the 
idea that, in order to stimulate private investment, it is necessary to stabilize the business 
environment.  
The aim of this paper is to analyze the relation between governance and investment in Sub 
Saharan Africa (SSA). In particular, we study how private investment is affected by regulatory 
and judiciary systems, political stability, macroeconomic conditions and corruption. The rest of 
the paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a brief overview of Sub-Saharan Africa 
economic situation, section 3 provides a brief review of related literature, section 4 is dedicated to 
the presentation of the methodology used in the study, section 5 discusses empirical results and 
section 6 concludes. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 African Economic Outlook, 2014 
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An overview of SSA macroeconomic and governance context  
 
The African continent has 54 countries with the Sahara desert separating it in two 
different geographical and economic entities, North Africa and the Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-
Saharan Africa comprises 49 countries with a combined population of 875 million in 2011. This 
Sub-Saharan part of Africa globally shares similar characteristics. 
On the economic side, Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the less advanced regions. 
According to the World Bank, 48.5% of the sub-Saharan population lived on less than $ 1.25 a 
day in 2010 (World Bank, 2013). Issue of development is still on the agenda for this region. 
Recent developments of macroeconomic indicators for SSA are favorable. Despite the effects 
of the 2008 financial crisis and a slight slowdown in 2013, the World Bank plans good prospects 
for the region. Since the mid-1990’s the region have achieved strong and sustained growth. In 
2013, average growth rate in SSA was 5% while growth rates of the continent as a whole and 
the global economy were respectively 4% and 3%.  
However, this relatively strong growth hides large disparities among countries. First, 
growth performance varies widely across countries. From 2006 to 2012 growth was good 
enough for some countries while others have experienced difficulties. For example, Burkina 
Faso records continuous growth over the period (an average of 5%) and Ghana experienced 
accelerated growth. Output growth in this country was continuously increasing. In contrast, 
Cote d'Ivoire had known negative growth rate from 2000 to 2004 and in 2011. This recession 
is mainly due to the crisis experienced by the country during the period. In 2012, the end of the 
political crisis marks the return of growth in this country with a growth rate of 9.5%. The second 
characteristic of sub-Saharan Africa growth is its high volatility in some countries. In 2001, the 
growth rate of Equatorial Guinea amounted to 63.4%. In 2008 and 2010, the growth rate of this 
same country was respectively -3% and -1.7%. The 2001 high growth rate in Equatorial Guinea 
is mainly due to the discovery and exploitation of new natural resources. But such volatility is 
a sign of the shakiness of the engines of growth. This feature is common to most of oil-exporting 
countries2. 
During the 2000 decade investment rate had an upward trend in Sub-Saharan Africa. It 
has gone from 17% in 1999 to 23% in 2009. Since then, investment to GDP ratio remained 
steady with an average rate of 22% on the period from 2010 to 2013, (IMF, 2013). The 
investment to GDP ratio increased from 17% in 1999 to 22,8% in 2013, (IMF, 2013). The global 
financial crisis had affected investment in the region. In 2010 and 2011 the region had 
experienced a decline of investment rate that could be attributed to the crisis. Private investment 
evolution did not display a clear trend. Private investment rate increased from 21.93% in 2006 
to 23% in 2007. From 2008 to 2010 it declined steadily to 21.39% in 2010 and rose slightly to 
22.55% in 2011. Regarding public investment, the region had experienced an increase in the 
investment to GDP ratio from 7.14% in 2006 to 9.5% in 2010, (World Bank, 2012). This rate 
dropped to 5.56% in 2011. FDI as a percentage of GDP is low for the region. But one should 
                                                 
2 Data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2013 
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mention that despite the low levels of FDI to GDP ratio, FDI flows increased considerably 
during the period. It was multiplied by four from 2006 to 2011, (IMF, 2013). 
The success of any development strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa requires stability, a sound 
legal and regulatory framework and good governance. The key risk factor that could hinder the 
good performance of the region is its stability (IMF, 2013). Several countries in SSA still face 
many conflicts and crises. One of four African countries suffers from the effects of armed conflict, 
while 20% of Africans live in areas severely disrupted by conflicts, (World Bank, 2011). The risk 
of conflict is quite high and the area is also prone to humanitarian crises and terrorist and criminal 
networks. This means that economic activities in the region are largely influenced by these 
conflicts. 
Regarding governance, the region has also mixed results. Poor governance and 
dysfunctional political institutions had led to the failure of several projects and development 
programs. SSA is the region with the lowest performance with respect to the Doing Business 
indicators. The countries of the region combine shaky jurisdictions and complex procedures and 
high costs. Because of these, the SSA is farthest from the distance to the frontier3. However, the 
region has narrowed the gap since the first publication of the DB report and is closest to the 
frontier. The region had recorded best performances in terms of improving the business 
environment.  
In addition to individual commitment of States in regulatory reforms, some countries have 
decided to get together to pursue this goal. These include the Organization for the Harmonization 
of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) whose focus is legal framework for the private sector. 
OHADA comprises 17 countries and aims at setting judicial integration of member countries to 
facilitate trade and investment, ensure legal and judicial security of business activities and facilitate 
the resolution of conflicts. Participating in such a group has the advantage of helping to harmonize 
national practices and to compel states to implement common decisions. This could be considered 
as a model of incentives for more dynamic and efficient investment. 
 
A brief review of related literature 
 
Many authors highlighted the importance of institutions based on comparisons of 
historically differentiated experiences in some regions. More importantly the difference in 
regimes is considered as the main reason behind the development of some regions and not 
others. By comparing the legal regimes in force in the seventeenth century across different parts 
of the world, North & Thomas (1973) explained why the economic take-off occurred in North-
West Europe and not in China -the most advanced nation of that period. Both authors agree that 
the explanation clearly lies in the nature of legal regimes that were governing these regions. In 
contrast to China, countries such as England and the Netherlands had well-defined property 
rights pushing individuals to entrepreneurism and innovation for better profits. 
                                                 
3 The 2012 Doing Business report introduced a new indicator, the distance to frontier to measure in absolute terms 
business regulatory efficiency. It asses how much the regulatory environment improves over time (World Bank, 
Doing Business 2014).    
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In the twentieth century, the world division into two blocs namely the socialist bloc with 
planned economy and the liberal block with market economy brought a new focus on the issues 
of property rights. According to Hayek, the lack of property rights disables prospects for 
benefits of officials and thus prevents the emergence of markets. The dislocation of the socialist 
bloc in the 1990’s comforted this idea. More specifically, a similar comparison is made by 
Acemoglu et al (2005) between both republics of Korea after the division of the country as a 
result of World War II. The Republic of Korea supported by the liberal western block and the 
People's Democratic Republic to the supported by the communist Soviet Union. The latter 
established socialist leanings institutions by removing property rights and centralizing 
economic decisions whereas the Republic in the South developed a market economy with a 
constitution and institutions providing incentives to the private sector. Both areas share similar 
characteristics in terms of cultures, ethnicities and languages; physical geography and climate 
were slightly different while initial conditions in capital stock in infrastructure were in favour 
of the Republic of Korea. Half a century after the separation, the national income of the South 
part was 15 times higher than income in the North. According to these authors the profound 
differences in economic institutions explain these differentiated experiences in terms of 
economic performance. 
In the same vein, De Soto (1990) seeking to identify the reasons for the low growth in 
Peru concluded that cumbersome administrative procedures, corruption and the prevalence of 
the informal sector are obstacles to economic dynamism. In such a situation, property rights are 
uncertain and risky compensation innovative initiatives, according to North. In 2000, De Soto 
(2000) added to his diagnosis that the lack of clearly defined rights complicates the corporate 
funding for enterprises. 
Recently, several empirical studies were carried out as from the 1990s attempting to 
econometrically establish the essential character of the quality of institutions, political stability 
and market conditions in the economic growth. We consider the studies of Gwartney & al. 
(1996) and the studies of LLSV4. Gwartney & al. (1996) use data of 96 countries over the period 
1975-1995 to study the relationship between freedom and economic growth. They used 17 
variables grouped into four blocks: currency and inflation; expropriation and discriminatory 
taxation; restrictions on international trade; and the size and function of the government. The 
results indicate that countries with higher freedom indices systematically have higher growth 
rates whilst the size of the government inhibits the growth. In subsequent publications from this 
study, it comes out that countries with improved freedom index have experienced stronger 
growth. In 2008, Gwartney et al. (2008) established a correlation between the value of the index 
of freedom and FDI. 
The findings from the LLSV studies were published in 1998 and 1999 respectively on 
corporate funding and the quality of governance. The basic idea of the first study was that 
companies cannot get funding or refunding from their creditors and shareholders unless they 
have confidence that their rights will be safeguarded by legal systems. They collect data on joint 
                                                 
4 LLSV refers to the initials of the authors and their work: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer and Vishny. 
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stock companies and sureties of 49 countries. They then grouped these countries into four 
groups of legal families: the Anglo-Saxon common law, civil law systems of French and 
German inspiration and the Scandinavian inspirations system.  
A primary result shows that investor protection significantly varies between legal 
families; it is stronger in the Anglo-Saxon system and lower in the French-inspired system. The 
end result meanwhile states that countries protecting investors have a weaker growth and low 
availability of capital. This result is economically plausible because these are investors 
responsible for the accumulation of capital, which is essential to the creation of income. In 
1999, the ambition of the authors was quite different but still focusing on institutions. They 
attempted to verify previous thesis instead of the quality of governance namely through public 
sector institutions (bureaucracy, size of the government, corruption, definition and enforcement 
of property rights ...) influencing economic growth. After collecting a large amount of data on 
the economic, cultural and religious policy variables, they proceeded with a series of 
regressions. The authors came to the conclusion that: the quality of governance is better in rich 
countries compared to poor countries, the same improvement was observed in Anglo-Saxon 
legal system countries compared to legal civil law tradition countries, and in countries 
dominated by Protestantism compared to countries dominated by Catholicism and Islam. In 
general, they established that the cultural and religious institutions and context as a whole affect 
the economic performance and the economic development, by extension. The LLSV study 
findings were so successful that the authors used them to write a thesis entitled Legal Oginis 
suggesting that legal systems condition the institutions established and economic outcomes, by 
extension. Such an argument would necessarily face critics. 
Dam (2006) made a critical review of the vision of the previous results. While accepting 
the idea that legal institutions have a critical role in development, the report first points out the 
fact that the indices of freedom, functioning and independence of the courts are difficult to 
interpret because of their composite construction. It then appears that there are not differences 
between legal families for the homelands of these legal traditions. La Porta & al. (2008) 
explained that such mother countries like France and Belgium implemented compensation 
mechanisms that corrected the weaknesses of their legal system. Spaman also criticizes the 
LLSV studies 1998 for using many subjective opinions in the development of some indices. An 
important point of controversy is highlighted by Rajan & Zingales (2003) on the development 
of financial markets. In fact, in 1919, the development of financial markets was more advanced 
in France than in the United States of America. In 1980, there was a reversal of this relation, 
while from 1999 the financial development converged in these two countries. That situation 
qualified as great reversal challenges the causal role of legal families. Milhaupt & Pistor (2008) 
examined a series of crises and connected them with legal families. They concluded that the 
predictive power of the theory of legal origins is difficult to establish. What matters to them is 
much more the adaptability of systems than the systems themselves. It is clear that the above 
criticism does not deny the role of public and legal institutions. There was therefore a global 
consensus resulting from the empirical studies and historical analyses. In the early 2000 century 
11 
 
International Journal of African Development v.2. n.1. Fall 2014 
more focused studies were conducted on how far the institutions influence the economic 
performance. 
As early as in the 2000s, research started linking economic performance to business 
environment indicators. This was made possible thanks to the DB WB project that expanded 
and systematized the work of La Porta et al. (1999) and Djankov & al (2002) through the 
publication of quantitative indicators on the environment companies. 
In the article The Regulation of Entry, Siméon Djankov, Raphael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-De-Silanès and Andrei Scheleifer based on data collected in 85 countries including 
seventeen (17) SSA countries, developed indicators related to the cost and the number of 
procedures one should go to start a typical business. The aim was to test the theories of 
regulation, that to see whether the regulations promote growth and well-being of consumers. 
Their results showed that countries with a complex regulation do not generally have a better 
quality of products; countries with high costs and complex procedures have a large informal 
economy and greater corruption. Conversely, they found that entry regulations are more 
transparent in democratic countries and those with a limited size of the government. The 
methodology they used to develop the indicators is largely close to that used by the World Bank 
to develop the Doing Business indicators. 
Djankov & al. (2006) considering these indicators for 135 countries showed the 
influence of the business environment reforms on the economic growth. By using the ranking 
of each country for the indicators, they developed a composite normalized index between 0 and 
1. They then regressed this index on per capita GDP growth rate by controlling the quality of 
governance and macroeconomic variables. The results showed that the DB indicators have a 
positive effect on the growth rate. In particular, countries whose indicators are gone from last 
to first quartile experienced a rate of 2.3% increase in their growth rate. 
Eifert (2009) also used the DB database from 2003 to 2007 to check the influence of 
DB reforms on investment and on the GDP. Analysis of the timing of the quantity of reform 
indicates a number of models. Reforms are globally distributed and their impact is more 
pronounced in countries with heavy regulations. Macroeconomic characteristics do not 
significantly influence the occurrence of reforms. From the overall goal of his study it clearly 
comes out that some reforms have a positive impact on the rate of investment and growth 
particularly in relatively poor and relatively well-governed countries; the median reform 
corresponding to a reduction of the deadlines for business registration by ten days would result 
in an increase in the investment rate of 0.27 and 0.15%, respectively. 
Klapper & Love (2001) successfully concluded that reforms promote the creation of 
new businesses and the aggregate investment on the World Bank database of 92 countries. After 
estimating the simple model, they sought to identify to what threshold countries must reduce 
an indicator of regulations of entrepreneurship so as to have the greatest change in the rate of 
business creation. They lead to relatively poor countries and relatively well-governed having a 
faster growth of 0.4% and 0.2% respectively after the implementation of one or several reforms. 
Unlike the studies presented above using country aggregated data, there are 
microeconomic studies that attempt to assess the impact of regulatory regimes on business 
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performance. We retain two studies conducted in this line. The first one conducted by Hallward-
Driemeier & al. (2006) focused on Chinese companies. The authors used data from the WB5 
for 1500 Chinese firms across five cities to measure more accurately the critical elements of the 
business environment. In fact, they believe that the overall environmental indicators such as 
DB indicators assigning a single score to each country have limitations insofar as the regulation 
is not uniform inside large countries such as China because of the high political and economic 
decentralization. They perform a series of regressions of various corporate business 
performance indicators on the business climate for each region of the country. Selected 
performance indicators include: the growth in sales, employment, the rate of investment and 
total factor productivity. Their indicators include regional averages of non-permanent 
employment rate, access to credit, the proportion of R&D workers using computers, losses due 
to power electric load-shedding, transport or waste of the time dedicated to administrative 
procedures and corruption scores. They think that these indicators and property are important 
for growth, productivity and business investment. The effect is particularly more remarkable 
for national and foreign capital property, the simplicity of regulations, corruption, technological 
development and the flexibility of the labour market. Oppositely the effect is less remarkable 
for improving access to credit and infrastructure quality. 
The second study also covered business and focused on Morocco. Augier & al. (2012) 
attempted to explain the role of the business environment in the performance of these 
companies. They used data from the annual inventories of Moroccan companies (1997 -2004) 
and from the WB. The business environment was captured based on access to credit, 
asymmetries in the application fees and the dealing with permits, the constraints related to 
administration and starting a business and the quality of infrastructure. Business performance 
was captured using the total factor productivity estimated by semi-parametric methods. The 
results showed a strong correlation between total factor productivity and access to credit; tax 
heterogeneity and the bureaucracy and the asymmetry in the application of regulations are 
associated with low productivity. 
To capture the impact of regulatory reform on investment, the starting point is the 
dynamic model of corporate behaviour. This model is widely described by Eifert (2009). The 
weight of the various economic sector regulations and the various stages of the business life 
had varied influence on their decision-making including the decision on whether to invest or 
not. The effects of regulations on businesses are examined through the changes they bring on 
fixed costs and variable costs and the recent adjustment costs of the latter.  
Regulations resulting in a change in fixed costs businesses almost exclusively affect the 
entry of new firms. When regulations create barriers to entry, they force potential entrants 
expecting low productivity to cancel or at least delay their entry. Most of them remain in the 
informal sector where regulatory requirements are lower, proportionally to development 
opportunities such as access to bank credit. On the other hand, this type of regulations acts as a 
filter that excludes low productivity enterprises. They also influence the degree of competition 
                                                 
5 The World Business Environment Survey 
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in the economy, increasing the marginal product of factors for existing businesses. In this way, 
this type of regulations has an ambiguous overall effect. 
Regulations affecting variable costs increase of enterprises namely production costs of 
each unit of product. They thus create a loss for the companies on each product unit sold. Very 
logically, they therefore affect the performance of the business they govern. As for the 
adjustment costs, they represent the different costs that companies incur as a result of 
fluctuations in the production but which are not followed by changes in the factors used because 
of the rigidities of the regulation. Such costs create friction depending on the size of the 
company. 
Ultimately, a decrease in fixed costs incurred by a regulatory reform could more likely 
result in facilitating the entry of low productivity anticipating a low level of profit. This could 
simplify access of the poor to the formal economy and to better opportunities. However, the 
regulations that significantly affecting the aggregate economic performance are those affecting 
the variable costs and the adjustment costs. However, we paid attention to regulations affecting 
business entry. In fact, a reform facilitates the entry of smaller firms but it facilitates greater 
productivity companies. Regulation has complex effects on businesses and the different 
categories of regulation could be integrated into a dynamic model of firm behaviour. 
Considering the enormous complexity of this model, it is possible to specify a more simple and 
operational model that captures the impact of the overall regulation on macroeconomic 
variables (Eifert, 2009). 
 
Methodology 
 
Variables specification and data sources 
 
In recent studies Doing Business indicators were used to capture the business environment 
and its impact on economic performances (Djankov and al (2006); Klapper & Love (2010); Eifert 
(2009)). Other indicators are available for this type of evaluation. But a quick analysis suggests 
that the DB indicators are strongly correlated with most other baseline indicators6. Therefore, this 
study will use the DB indicators as indicators of the business environment. Besides the usual DB 
indicators the new indicator, the distance to the frontier will be used.  
Three of the ten categories of indicators will not be considered in this study. The first one 
is getting electricity. Data for this area is only available over half of the study period (from 2009). 
The two other indicators are protecting investors and getting credit. Data for these categories of 
indicators do not vary over the period for the countries covered.  
For selected categories, preference is given to the time taken, expressed in days, to 
implement procedure rather than to the number of procedures. Both indicators contain the same 
information but the timeline is a more informative than the number of procedures.  
                                                 
6 The indicators of the markets regulation and the OECD products and the World competitiveness index of the 
World Economic Forum are strongly correlated to DB index. 
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Cost indicators evaluated as a percentage of GDP do not enable to measure the 
implemented reforms since their variations are largely influenced by GDP variations. Yet, GDP is 
widely volatile for many sub-Saharan African countries. These indicators will not be taken into 
account. Such indicators include the cost for starting a business; the cost for dealing with 
construction permits, the minimum capital for starting a business as a percentage of GDP. Not all 
areas assessed are subject to common practices across all the countries of the region. For example, 
countries such as South Africa, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Mauritania do not have 
practice for three of the four indicators for resolving insolvency regulation. These three indicators 
are also discarded from the analysis. 
 
Progress of DB indicators over the period  
 
Data from thirty eight countries are used for the study over the period 2006-2011. During 
this period some indicators have been improved to facilitate the business culture. To assess the 
evolution of these indicators over the period for the sampled countries, we observed the progress 
of three specific values namely, the mean, minimum and maximum of each indicator. Table 1 
displays these figures. Most number of days required to complete procedures are on average below 
100 days, except for dealing with construction permits (over 200 days) and especially for the 
implementation of contracts which varies very slightly and remains higher than 600 days over the 
entire period. The average number of days generally tends to slightly decrease. Average costs also 
showed a downward trend, except for costs relating to trading across-borders (exports and imports) 
that have an upward trend; there was a steeper decline in the average cost of dealing with 
construction permits. The slight change in the average level of indicators does not mean that these 
indicators have not improved. In fact, countries performed different levels of reforms in the areas 
measured. Some countries experienced very low progress while others experienced significant 
improvements. In this way, improvements in indicators were not sufficient to significantly change 
the average levels. For example, for the number of days related to starting a business, Equatorial 
Guinea increased only from 137 days to 135 days, while Burkina Faso and Rwanda increased from 
40 and 200 days to 14 and 8 days respectively. 
Extreme values of the indicators did not significantly vary as well. The minimum level 
decreased for nine indicators but stayed unchanged for four indicators in 2006 and 2011; the 
minimum level increased for three indicators. Regarding the upper ends, the maximum levels 
increased for seven indicators, decreased for eight indicators; remained at the initial level for only 
one. Once again, the strong distribution of reforms comes out of this. Reforms in different fields 
are distributed across countries and over the period; and the scope of the reforms is also distributed 
in space and time. 
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Table 1: Progress of Doing Business 
indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa   2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Time for starting a business 
min  13 13 7 6 3 3 
Mean 57 55 50 44 42 42 
Max 153 135 135 161 161 161 
 
Cost for starting a business 
min  8.6 6.9 5.3 1.7 1.4 1.5 
Mean 244.4 196.1 191.8 135.3 119.6 93 
Max 209.5 1314.6 1180.7 935.4 847.6 228.4 
Time dealing with construction permits 
Min 79 79 79 79 53 75 
Mean 213 219 20 224 205 199 
Max 533 533 533 614 614 614 
Cost for dealing with construction 
permits 
min  14.7 13.4 16.4 13.1 9.4 10.9 
Mean 1779.57 1612.9 1619.6 1218 1318.3 1030 
Max 13205.2 10829.4 12219.7 8794.5 13138 6822.8 
Time for registering property 
min  9 9 9 9 9 9 
Mean 103 92 88 80 70.4 65 
Max 397 371 371 334 295 295 
Cost for registering property 
min  1.6 1.7 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.4 
Mean 11.9 11.95 11.43 10.52 9.97 9 
Max 25 27.1 27.9 25 20.6 20.6 
Number of taxes payments 
Min 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Mean 41 40 40 40 39.7 40 
Max 66 66 66 66 66 64 
 
Total of tax payments 
min  15.4 15.4 15 15 15 14.3 
Mean 76.5 78.47 77.5 77.3 73.6 73.5 
Max 286.5 292.1 292.1 292.1 292.1 339.1 
Time for Importation 
min  13 13 13 13 11 10 
Mean 48 47 44 42 40 39 
Max 78 102 102 102 100 101 
Cost for Importation 
Min 683 683 673 677 689 689 
Mean 2111 2086.5 2112.2 2404.6 2475.3 2650.9 
Max 5715 5715 5715 6215 6345 8525 
Time for Exportation 
min  13 13 14 14 11 10 
Mean 39 37 36 35 34 32 
Max 78 78 78 78 75 75 
Costs for exportation 
min  463 624 697 725 737 737 
Mean 1675.3 1679.4 1698.4 1926.7 1988.5 2032.6 
Max 4867 4867 4867 5367 5497 5902 
Time for enforcing contracts  
min  276 276 276 276 260 230 
Mean 653 656 655 667 651 647 
Max 1070 1280 1280 1280 1280 1296 
Cost for enforcing contracts 
Min 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 
Mean 53.1 52.6 52.6 51.9 51.9 52.7 
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Max 151.8 151.8 151.8 151.8 151.8 151.8 
Average for resolving insolvency  
min  0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 17.7 20.1 18.1 18 18.2 19.1 
Max 51.8 57.5 57.1 57.5 57.5 60.8 
Source: Authors from the World Bank Doing Business data 
 
Correlations between indicators  
 
We started by investigating the existence of a correlation between indicators applied to a 
same area (Table 2). A positive correlation could be observed between the indicators for starting 
a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, trading across borders and 
paying taxes. The correlation is remarkably high for the time and costs for export and import (over 
50%) as well as for starting a business.  
 
 
Table 2: Correlation between indicators of the same area 
                Indicators   Correlation7 
 
Starting a business  
Deadline 
0.32 
Cost  
 
Dealing with construction permits  
Deadline 
0.15 
Cost 
 
Registering property 
Deadline 
0.10 
Cost 
 
Payment of taxes 
Number of payments  
0.045 
global average 
 
Enforcing contracts 
Deadline 
0.074 
Cost 
 
 
Trading across-border  
Deadline for exportation 
0.70 
Cost for exportation 
Deadline for importation 
0.73 
Cost of importation 
Regulation of insolvency recovery rate Recovery average  
Source: Authors from the World Bank Doing Business data 
Data displayed show existence of strong correlation between indicators of cross-border trade.  
                                                 
7 Interrelationship between the indicators of the same category 
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The correlation between the time for export and import is 90% and the one between the 
costs of the same indicators is over 91%8. We retain for the estimations indicators related to export. 
Following the same logic, for areas showing indicators with a relatively high correlation, we use a 
single indicator and show preference to time indicators rather than the costs as they are expressed 
in relative values, so that the variations observed can be due to comparable variables. Conversely, 
variations deadlines better capture the effects of reforms. Candidate Business environment 
indicators are the following:  
 The deadline for starting a business;  
 The deadline for dealing with construction permits;  
 The deadline and cost for registering property; 
 The deadline and cost for enforcing contracts;  
 The deadline and costs of exportation;  
 The number of payments and total amount paid for taxes;  
 The rate of insolvency collection.  
 
Macroeconomic variables 
We consider macroeconomic variables from the database of the World Bank for SSA. 
These macroeconomic variables include the variable of interest pertaining to private investment 
and variables that explain the level of investment. They also serve as a control variables. The GDP 
growth rate enables to control the influence of economic cycles. Variables capturing the quality of 
the policy environment and governance are also used as controls as agents may change their 
investment decisions based on the levels of these indices: Political Rights and civil Liberties 
indices of Freedom House and the perception of corruption by Transparency International.  
Private investment is the variable being observed. It is represented by private sector gross fixed 
capital formation. We have already mentioned the upward trend between 2006 and 2011 of this 
variable in the previous section. The theories presented on the relationship between investment 
and business environment is reminiscent of a correlation. Yet, there is no prior indication of such 
relationship. That is why in the development of private investment we must get to discard the 
effects of other variables to only keep those of the business environment.  
Macroeconomic variables used as control variables are the following:  
 The GDP growth rate: The product level is a key determinant in deciding to invest in the 
economic literature: either whether ex-ante in the Keynesian base model and ex-post in the 
classic model. In general, it is clear that we decide to invest in order to achieve production.  
 The balance of the current account  
 Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP  
 Inflation  
 Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP  
 The quality of governance and institutions  
                                                 
8 A similar result has been found by Eifert B., (2009) on the relative indicators to the imports and exports for 135 
countries. 
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Evaluation is done here based on two indices published by Freedom House and 
Transparency International for the countries covered. Every year Transparency International 
publishes an indicator called Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) based on expert opinion surveys. 
Countries are ranked from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low level of perceived corruption). The series 
of this index was created from CPI reports from 2006 to 2011. In general, they indicate a strong 
correlation between corruption and poverty. In 2006, only two SSA countries (Botswana and 
Mauritius) had an index over 5. In 2011, only Cape Verde and Rwanda were added to the top half 
of the index. This reflects a positive trend for the indicator though at a very moderate pace in the 
area. Since 1950, Freedom House has been publishing annually indicators on the state of civil 
liberties and political rights. Both indices are available on the website of the institution; vary 
between 1 and 7. One stands for best performances of rights and liberties and, 7 stands for the 
poorest performance. The political rights index considers three areas: electoral process, political 
pluralism and participation and functioning of government. The index of civil liberties includes 
the following areas: freedom of expression and belief, freedom of association and organization, 
law enforcement and personal autonomy and individual liberties. We found a strong correlation 
between these two indices (around 90%), which led us to consider that the index of civil liberties 
in the estimate. 
The model 
 
There are various models used to investigate the relation between regulation and economic 
performance at the level of firms or countries depending on the nature of the data used. Djankov 
& al. (2006) studied correlations between regulation indicators and economic performance of firms 
using cross-sectional data. The model used is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝑥′𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖  Where 𝑦𝑖  measures economic performance and 𝑥𝑖  measures regulatory 
indicators and control variables.  
However, the hypothesis of identification 𝐸[𝜀𝑖|𝑥𝑖] = 0 indicating that there are no omitted 
variables that affect the economic performance and are correlated with indicators and variables of 
control seem to be strong enough. An improved version of this model is proposed by Rajan & 
Zingales (1998) using also cross-sectional data but taking the explanatory variables in double 
differences. This way of doing captures changes in the economic performance affected by changes 
in the regulatory environment. The first advantage of this model is that it addresses the issue of 
omitted variables. However, it shares the common limitation characterizing cross-sectional data 
models: non-inclusion of individual-specific structural differences on the dependent variable.  
The basic model used in this study is similar to that of Eifert (2009). Panel data procedure 
will be performed. The model is as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  
under the hypothesis 𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖𝑡; 𝑐𝑖, 𝜗𝑡] implying that the errors are not correlated with indicators 
given the 𝑐𝑖  individual effects and  𝜗𝑡  temporal effects. This model is advantageous for many 
reasons. Above all, it addresses the issue of omitted variables constant over time. In addition, it 
helps control the country-specific trends. These two points are important for our subject because 
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the regulatory framework is often heavily influenced by national or sub-regional policies such as 
employment promotion policies often through the provision of loan facility.  
The model used for the estimation is as follows:  
 INVESTit = X'itβ + αiPIBit + γiDGVRNMTit + δiCREDITit + θiPIBit-1 +
ρ
i
INVESTit-1+σiINFLATit + τiCLit + φiIPCit + ci + ϑt + εit                
Where 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a vector of business environment indicators for the country 𝑖   in year  𝑡 ;  
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡, stands for private investment as a percentage of GDP for country 𝑖   in year  𝑡  ;  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 is GDP annual growth rate of country 𝑖   in year  𝑡  ;  
𝐷𝐺𝑉𝑅𝑁𝑀𝑇𝑖𝑡, stands for Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP for country 𝑖 in year 𝑡;  
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑡  is Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP for country 𝑖 in year  𝑡;  
𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 The balance of the current account as a percentage of GDP for country 𝑖   in year  𝑡  ;  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡−1  (it-1) the rate of GDP growth for country i lagged for one period;  
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡−1 (it-1) private investment as a percentage of GDP, lagged for country 𝑖   in year  𝑡  ;  
𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑡 The inflation rate for country 𝑖   in year  𝑡  ;  
𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  et 𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖𝑡 index of civil liberties and the index of perception of corruption for country 𝑖   in 
year  𝑡  ;  
𝑐𝑖  Specific timeless effect for country;  
𝜗𝑡 The temporal effect common in all countries;  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 The error term  
 
The hypothesis of identification supposes that the errors are not correlated with 
macroeconomic and control indicators and variables. Adding lagged dependent variable to the 
regressor responds to the need to consider the dynamics of investment. Like most macroeconomic 
variables, investment is dependent on cyclical developments; hence the level of investment in a 
given year may correlate with the previous investment levels. Furthermore, the presence of this 
lagged variable makes our model a dynamic panel model. Assessing such a model requires specific 
procedures.  
The procedure for assessment  
Two models are implemented depending on the on the nature of indicators used: the first 
(Model I) uses the common DB indicators while the second one (Model II) uses the indicators of 
distance to the frontier. These two models are estimated for the entire sample.  
In the investment equation, the lagged investment appears as an explanatory variable; so we are in 
the presence of a dynamic panel. In addition, the time dimension of our panel is relatively reduced 
compared to the number of individuals. For this, we use the Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) system developed by Blundell & Bond (1998), which is suitable for estimating panel 
whose temporal dimension is reduced according to Rodman (2006). The author shows the 
weakness of the other estimators compares to the benefits of the GMM estimator in situations 
similar to ours.  
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The GMM estimator is based on the orthogonality conditions between the lagged variables 
and the error term. The first GMM estimator is the one with first difference developed by Arellano 
& Bond (1991). It also takes the first difference of the original model, which eliminates the 
individual effects. The values of the endogenous variables lagged one period or more are 
increasingly integrated as tools. The estimation is done in two steps. However, this estimator has 
a limitation as it does not take the effect of factors invariant over time into account. Thus, small 
samples lead to biased results. To fill the gap of the dynamic panel estimator by Arellano and 
Bond, Blundell & Bond (1998) developed the GMM estimator system. It combines the in level 
and first difference equations, hence the characterization as system. The level equation uses 
different tools from the difference equation. In our case, we use the one-step GMM estimator 
system of Blundell and Bond. We introduce the following tools: the lagged two periods to take 
investment adjustments into account.  
 
Empirical results 
Diagnostic tests 
Before performing the panel procedure and the GMM procedure, a number of tests are 
required. It is essential perform a specification test in order to check whether the data available 
match with the panel model. When considering panel data, the first step is to check the requirement 
of homogeneous or heterogeneous data generating process (Hurlin & Mignon, 2006). This consists 
in checking in the econometric model envisioned whether the coefficients are the same for all 
countries. The over identification and error auto-correlation test should be also performed to check 
for the validity of the tools used. These tests were performed. The results are shown in Table 3 and 
Table 4. Data in table 3 indicate that the values of Fisher statistic do not enable to accept the null 
hypothesis of no individual effects. The equation with individual effects defined above is therefore 
assumed. The statistic of autocorrelation error tested by the Arellano and Bond method indicates 
that only errors are auto-correlated at order 1 but not at order 2 (Table 4). The Hansen-Sargan 
statistics for the GMM estimated models have critical values higher than 10% (Table 4). We 
therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis of validity of the tools. 
 
 
Table 3: Results of the specification test  
 SSA 
 Model I Model II 
Fischer 10.19 8.85 
 P-Value 0.000 0.000 
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Table 4: Results of autocorrelation and over-identification test 
 SSA 
 Modèle I Modèle II 
AR(1) 
-1,89 
(0,059) 
-1,76 
(0,079) 
AR(2) 
-0,344 
(0,731) 
-0,64 
(0,522) 
Hansen 
32,71 
(0,307) 
21,81 
(0,410) 
 
Results and interpretation  
Ten out of the eleven indicators that were measured are expected to be negatively correlated 
to investment. Only the recovery rate is supposed to positively influence investment rate in case 
of insolvency. The results of the estimations are reported in Tables 5 for Model I and Table 6 for 
Model II. For Model I, only three indicators have the expected signs: the deadline for starting a 
business, the deadline for registering property and the cost for enforcing contracts. The deadline 
for starting a business is not significant while the deadline for registering property and the cost for 
enforcing contracts are significant at the 5% and 1% significant level respectively. Empirical 
evidence enables us to assert a positive effect of these two indicators on private investment. More 
specifically, based on our results, reducing the deadline by 10 days for registering property 
generates an increase in investment up to 0.16% of GDP. Likewise, a10%, decrease in the cost that 
enterprises incur to enforce contracts leads to a higher investment rate of 0, 32 points.  
 
Table 5: Results of Model I   
Field Indicators Estimated coefficient p-value  
Starting a business Deadline -0.001384 0.853 
Dealing with construction  
permits 
Deadline 0.0047463* 0.081 
Registering property  
Deadline -0.0155097** 0.038 
Cost 0.083596 0.332 
Payment of taxes 
Number of payments  0.0781372* 0.051 
Global rate 0.0114703** 0.012 
Exportation 
Deadline 0.0363033 0.184 
Cost 0.000467 0.338 
Enforcing contracts 
Deadline 0.0043659*** 0.000 
Cost -0.0323676*** 0.004 
Resolving insolvency  Recovery rate -0.0683689** 0.022 
*** indicates 1% level of significance; ** indicates 5% level of significance; * indicates 10% level of 
significance. 
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These results are particularly interesting regarding the effects of the business environment 
on investment. However, it should be underlined that we get only two significant indicators and 
many do not have the expected sign. Eifert (2009) also obtained mixed results in the estimate of 
the investment function: all the coefficients of the indicators had the expected signs but none were 
significant. One reason for this may be of practical order. Even though the indicators potentially 
influence investment decisions, it is possible that investors do not attach the same importance to 
all indicators as well. This is plausible to the extent that the measured data do not affect businesses 
to the same magnitude. Large investors would give great importance to enforcing contracts as they 
are frequently involved in larger contracts, while small investors would closely look at the 
procedures and entry costs. Another interesting fact regarding the deadline for starting a business 
is the following one: while this is the area most frequently cited in the reforms, it is not significant 
in any estimation as in Eifert (2009). Without being able to give an exact explanation of this result, 
this could be linked to the fact that although investors attach importance to the procedures of entry, 
they care about challenges encountered in carrying out their activities.  
Moreover, it should be reminded that the DB indicators measure the de jure regulations, 
while there are practices overriding these legal arrangements. The facto regulations including 
corruption and the payment of bribes, could therefore replace the regulation captured by indicators. 
We should then moderate the expected influence of these indicators on investment. According to 
Eifert (2009) there is a clear need to consider whether the reforms captured by indicators have an 
impact, because of the irregularities and the non-enforcement; This particularly makes sense for 
developing countries. 
 
Table 6: Estimate results of Model II for SSA  
Indicators Estimated coefficient p-value 
Starting a business  0.0936672*** 0.000 
Dealing with construction permits -0.0839274*** 0.000 
Registering property -0.0568171*** 0.000 
Getting credit  -0.0123015 0.734 
Payment of taxes -0.0850154*** 0.000  
Trade across borders -0.0017965 0.925 
Enforcing contracts 0.0454649 0.178 
Resolving Insolvency  -0.0284549 0.318 
*** indicates 1% level of significance; ** indicates 5% level of significance; * indicates 10% level of 
significance. 
 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of Model II. Six out of the eight indicators of 
distance to the frontier have the expected sign: dealing with construction permits, registering 
property, getting credit, paying taxes, resolving insolvency and trading across borders. Dealing 
with construction permits, registering property and the payment of taxes are significant at the 1%. 
These results show that increase for a relative distance of a country compared to best practices in 
dealing with construction permits, registering property and the payment of taxes, this generates a 
decline in the investment. This could be explained by the fact that investors or appreciate based on 
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the location of investment firms: they seek the best return for their money and are encouraged to 
select countries where regulations are relatively flexible, simpler, and less expensive . The 
implications of this finding are important. Indeed, countries wishing to attract investment must 
work to bring best practices in terms of regulations because arbitration can be done on the target 
invest countries as a result of capital mobility. 
 
Conclusion and policy implication 
 
This study aimed at determining the causal relationship between business environment and 
economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank doing Business indicators along 
with other macroeconomic variable were used to perform a panel analysis using a GMM 
procedure. The results of the estimations show that the time taken for registering property and the 
cost and time of transfer of ownership have a significant impact on private investment.  The results 
indicate also that region were able to narrow the distance to the frontier with construction permits, 
registering property, getting credit, paying taxes, resolving insolvency and trading across borders. 
From a policy point of view, the study highlighted the fact that SSA countries must continue the 
reform undertaken so as to reduce the burden of regulations on businesses. Along with 
implementing actions to foster the effect of good business practices, corruption and bureaucracy 
should be tackled to reduce the gap between rules and practices. Third, the DB indicators to be 
more useful to investors should pay attention to the countries realities and particularities; these are 
the real facts that need to be considered because there are the ones that actually affect investors. 
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